RT Article
T1 Seemings and the Response to Radical Skepticism
JF International journal for the study of skepticism
VO 13
IS 2
SP 105
OP 119
A1 Lemos, Noah M. 1956-
LA English
YR 2023
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1852575697
AB I begin by making some brief remarks about commonsense particularism. Commonsense particularists hold that we know pretty much what we think we know and hold that some of these beliefs are more reasonable than competing skeptical principles. However, commonsense philosophers often differ about what justifies these particular beliefs. Michael Bergmann holds that that our commonsense epistemic beliefs depend for their justification on epistemic intuitions or epistemic seemings. After a brief description of his views, I raise some questions about the nature and epistemic role of these epistemic seemings.
K1 Skepticism
K1 seeming
K1 epistemic intuition
K1 Particularism
K1 commonsense
DO 10.1163/22105700-bja10046