Seemings and the Response to Radical Skepticism
I begin by making some brief remarks about commonsense particularism. Commonsense particularists hold that we know pretty much what we think we know and hold that some of these beliefs are more reasonable than competing skeptical principles. However, commonsense philosophers often differ about what...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2023
|
| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2023, Volume: 13, Issue: 2, Pages: 105-119 |
| Further subjects: | B
seeming
B epistemic intuition B Particularism B commonsense B Skepticism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
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| 520 | |a I begin by making some brief remarks about commonsense particularism. Commonsense particularists hold that we know pretty much what we think we know and hold that some of these beliefs are more reasonable than competing skeptical principles. However, commonsense philosophers often differ about what justifies these particular beliefs. Michael Bergmann holds that that our commonsense epistemic beliefs depend for their justification on epistemic intuitions or epistemic seemings. After a brief description of his views, I raise some questions about the nature and epistemic role of these epistemic seemings. | ||
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