RT Article
T1 Précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition
JF International journal for the study of skepticism
VO 13
IS 2
SP 91
OP 94
A1 Bergmann, Michael 1964-
LA English
YR 2023
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1852575670
AB In this précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition, I highlight the main lines of argument in the book and provide an outline of each of the book’s three parts. I explain how: Part I lays out an argument for radical skepticism and objects to one of the two main ways of responding to it; Part ii presents my version of the other main way of responding to that skeptical argument (a version that relies heavily on epistemic intuition); and Part iii defends epistemic intuition (and, thereby, my response to radical skepticism) from several important objections.
K1 Underdetermination
K1 Skepticism
K1 seemings
K1 Particularism
K1 Intuition
K1 Common Sense
DO 10.1163/22105700-bja10058