The Place of Pleasure in Neo-Aristotelian Ethics
Richard Kraut argues that Neo-Aristotelian ethics should include a commitment to "diluted hedonism," according to which the exercise of a developed life-capacity is good for S only if and partly because S enjoys it. I argue that the Neo-Aristotelian should reject diluted hedonism for two...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
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| Published: |
Philosophy Documentation Center
2023
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| In: |
American catholic philosophical quarterly
Year: 2023, Volume: 97, Issue: 1, Pages: 101-119 |
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| 520 | |a Richard Kraut argues that Neo-Aristotelian ethics should include a commitment to "diluted hedonism," according to which the exercise of a developed life-capacity is good for S only if and partly because S enjoys it. I argue that the Neo-Aristotelian should reject diluted hedonism for two reasons: first, it compromises the generality and elegance of the initial developmentalist account; second, it leads to mistaken evaluations of some of the most important and ennobling capacities and activities in human life. Finally, I argue that a more plausible account of the place of pleasure in the good life derives from Aristotle’s discussion in book X of the Nicomachean Ethics: pleasure is a supervenient good that signifies the value of the underlying capacity and activity, but it is not a necessary condition for their goodness. | ||
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