Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Moral Skepticism: Divine Moral Knowledge as Transcendent and Continuous with Human Moral Knowledge
One objection to skeptical theism is that it implies radical moral skepticism. Humans cannot make any moral judgments on this view because of their ignorance of the inaccessible divine knowledge that is called upon to explain the existence of apparently gratuitous evil. In answering this objection,...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Published: |
Evangelical Philosophical Society
2022
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In: |
Philosophia Christi
Year: 2022, Volume: 24, Issue: 2, Pages: 257-269 |
IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God NCA Ethics |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | One objection to skeptical theism is that it implies radical moral skepticism. Humans cannot make any moral judgments on this view because of their ignorance of the inaccessible divine knowledge that is called upon to explain the existence of apparently gratuitous evil. In answering this objection, I propose two important moves for skeptical theists. First, skeptical theists should be positive skeptical theists (the existence of God positively implies the appearance of gratuitous evil), rather than negative skeptical theists (the appearance of gratuitous evil is probabilistically inscrutable given theism). Second, the skeptical theist can affirm a model of divine transcendence whereby the unknown divine moral knowledge is continuous with human moral knowledge. These two moves, I contend, assist in saving skeptical theism from accusations of radical moral skepticism. |
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ISSN: | 2640-2580 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Philosophia Christi
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/pc202224222 |