The Taste of the Mango: A Jaina-Buddhist Controversy on Evidence

In the classical framework of Indian philosophy, the different schools of thought agree on the fact that the correctness of an inference relies on a special necessary relation standing between the evidence-property and the target-property. In this framework, there is a controversy between Buddhist a...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gorisse, Marie-Hélène (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: 2015
In: International Journal of Jaina Studies
Year: 2015, Volume: 11, Issue: 3, Pages: 1-19
Online Access: Volltext (kostenfrei)

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520 |a In the classical framework of Indian philosophy, the different schools of thought agree on the fact that the correctness of an inference relies on a special necessary relation standing between the evidence-property and the target-property. In this framework, there is a controversy between Buddhist and Jain philosophers concerning the marks of this necessary relation, named the “invariable concomitance”. More precisely, whereas the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti holds that only two types of inferential evidence, namely natural property and effect, can ensure that inferential reasoning relies upon an invariable concomitance, the Jain Māṇikyanandi claims that there are no less than six situations in which the presence of an invariable concomitance is unquestionable, namely when the evidence-property is pervaded by the target-property, or when it is its effect, its cause, its predecessor, its successor or its co-existent. In this line, the typical answer from the Buddhist side is to show that any evidence other than natural property and effect can in fact be traceable to one of them. Contrarily, the Jain strategy is to show that natural property and effect are not sufficient in order to give a correct account of the diversity of correct inferences. The aim of this paper is to give a presentation of these discrepancies between the Jain and the Buddhist theories of inference, as they are found in Māṇikyanandi’s Parīkṣāmukham, the Introduction to Philosophical Investigation, a digest of Akalaṅka’s mature philosophy on one side, and in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti, his Auto-commentary on the Essay on Knowledge on the other side. 
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