NORMATIVE GROUND OF THE JUDGEMENT OF MORAL OBLIGATION

Can a judgment of moral obligation, e.g.,' 1 ought to do X, where X stands for a specific moral action, be true or false? Is such a judgment empirical, and if so, in what sense? What method or mental operation is involved in the verification of such a judgment This line of questioning arises be...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Mitias, Michael H. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Dharmaram College 1979
In: Journal of Dharma
Year: 1979, Volume: 4, Issue: 4, Pages: 398-406
Further subjects:B Judgement
B Moral Obligation
Online Access: Volltext (kostenfrei)

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