The Modal-Epistemic Argument Defended: Reply to Wintein
Recently, Stefan Wintein published an article in which he presents four objections to my modal-epistemic argument for the existence of God. His first objection is an alleged counterexample to the argument’s first premise, and the second objection is an alleged counterexample to the argument’s second...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado: |
2022
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| En: |
Sophia
Año: 2022, Volumen: 61, Número: 4, Páginas: 775-793 |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Modal-epistemic argument
B Personal first cause B God B Wintein |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Sumario: | Recently, Stefan Wintein published an article in which he presents four objections to my modal-epistemic argument for the existence of God. His first objection is an alleged counterexample to the argument’s first premise, and the second objection is an alleged counterexample to the argument’s second premise. Wintein’s third objection attempts to show that the modal-epistemic argument is circular. Finally, the fourth objection is a parody objection. In this paper, I show that Wintein’s four objections all fail. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-022-00909-0 |
