Can Knowledge Itself Justify Harmful Research?

In our paper, we argue for three necessary conditions for morally permissible animal research: (1) an assertion (or expectation) of sufficient net benefit, (2) a worthwhile-life condition, and (3) a no-unnecessary-harm/qualified-basic-needs condition.1 We argue that these conditions are necessary, w...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Authors: Sebo, Jeff (Author) ; Degrazia, David (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Cambridge Univ. Press 2020
In: Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
Year: 2020, Volume: 29, Issue: 2, Pages: 302-307
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

MARC

LEADER 00000naa a22000002 4500
001 1827987537
003 DE-627
005 20221220052703.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 221220s2020 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1017/S0963180119001087  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1827987537 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1827987537 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Sebo, Jeff  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
109 |a Sebo, Jeff 
245 1 0 |a Can Knowledge Itself Justify Harmful Research? 
264 1 |c 2020 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a In our paper, we argue for three necessary conditions for morally permissible animal research: (1) an assertion (or expectation) of sufficient net benefit, (2) a worthwhile-life condition, and (3) a no-unnecessary-harm/qualified-basic-needs condition.1 We argue that these conditions are necessary, without taking a position on whether they are jointly sufficient. In their excellent commentary on our paper, Matthias Eggel, Carolyn Neuhaus, and Herwig Grimm (hereafter, the authors) argue for a friendly amendment to one of our three conditions.2 In particular, they argue for replacing the first condition—expectation of sufficient net benefit (ESNB)—with an expectation of knowledge production (EKP).3 In this reply, we will explain why we are open to this proposed amendment, but not yet convinced. 
601 |a Knowledge 
700 1 |a Degrazia, David  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics  |d Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992  |g 29(2020), 2, Seite 302-307  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)306655039  |w (DE-600)1499985-7  |w (DE-576)081985010  |x 1469-2147  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:29  |g year:2020  |g number:2  |g pages:302-307 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180119001087  |x Resolving-System  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
856 4 0 |u https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-quarterly-of-healthcare-ethics/article/can-knowledge-itself-justify-harmful-research/882280240D95AECE4501AFB7A4B3579F  |x Verlag  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
935 |a mteo 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 4235392441 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1827987537 
LOK |0 005 20221220052703 
LOK |0 008 221220||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2022-12-06#A868BACE7D7FF6D1565D4669ED0517DDB767C22F 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixrk  |a zota 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw