RT Article
T1 Artificial Intelligence: The Shylock Syndrome
JF Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
VO 25
IS 2
SP 250
OP 261
A1 Lawrence, David R.
A2 Palacios-González, César
A2 Harris, John
LA English
YR 2016
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1827978201
AB It seems natural to think that the same prudential and ethical reasons for mutual respect and tolerance that one has vis-à-vis other human persons would hold toward newly encountered paradigmatic but nonhuman biological persons. One also tends to think that they would have similar reasons for treating we humans as creatures that count morally in our own right. This line of thought transcends biological boundaries—namely, with regard to artificially (super)intelligent persons—but is this a safe assumption? The issue concerns ultimate moral significance: the significance possessed by human persons, persons from other planets, and hypothetical nonorganic persons in the form of artificial intelligence (AI). This article investigates why our possible relations to AI persons could be more complicated than they first might appear, given that they might possess a radically different nature to us, to the point that civilized or peaceful coexistence in a determinate geographical space could be impossible to achieve.
K1 Nature
K1 Personhood
K1 Moral Significance
K1 Survival
K1 Motivation
K1 Humanity
K1 Artificial Intelligence
DO 10.1017/S0963180115000559