Emergence and Human Uniqueness: Limiting or Delimiting Evolutionary Explanation?
Abstract. Philip Clayton's book Mind and Emergence presents a highly sophisticated argument against any kind of uncritical theology that might want to follow science into a world of overly narrow, compartmentalized disciplines that do not sufficiently communicate between themselves. Clayton arg...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Open Library of Humanities$s2024-
2006
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In: |
Zygon
Year: 2006, Volume: 41, Issue: 3, Pages: 649-664 |
Further subjects: | B
Polanyi's Principle
B religious sensibility B moral sensibilities B and intelligence B emergence of life B aesthetic sensibility B the limits of interdisciplinarity B Convergence B physical causation B interdisciplinary dialogue B levels of complexity B Emergence B evolution of culture B human uniqueness B evolutionary epistemology B Personhood B mental causation |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | Abstract. Philip Clayton's book Mind and Emergence presents a highly sophisticated argument against any kind of uncritical theology that might want to follow science into a world of overly narrow, compartmentalized disciplines that do not sufficiently communicate between themselves. Clayton argues persuasively that the basic structure of the phenomenal world is multileveled, with emergent properties and degrees of freedom that cannot be adequately described, predicted, or explained in terms of lower-level phenomena only. Moreover, the various levels of organization are linked to one another by interfaces of mutual constraint in terms of upward and downward causation. The most valuable part of Clayton's argument, however, is that in a philosophy of emergence one must also, if not especially, account for the role of the biological sciences and especially for the influence of human thoughts and skills, human choices and actions, and—one of the most important causes of all—human purposes. Clayton's biggest challenge is that the level of human personhood offers us the only appropriate level to introduce the question of God and the possibility of divine agency. I critically evaluate this central claim and its implications not only for the extent of divine influence on the world but also for the scope and limitations of the interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and the sciences. |
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ISSN: | 1467-9744 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Zygon
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9744.2005.00766.x |