Autonomy and Interrelatedness: Spinoza, Hume, and Vasubandhu

Abstract. If reason and emotion are taken as inseparable founda–tional components of human nature, then all knowledge must be characterized by both objective description and subjective, felt experience. If that is the case, then it is impossible for autonomy to be described in terms of rational know...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Tomm, Winnifred A. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Open Library of Humanities$s2024- 1987
In: Zygon
Year: 1987, Volume: 22, Issue: 4, Pages: 459-478
Further subjects:B Morality
B Hume
B Vasu–bandhu
B Spinoza
B Emotion
B Reason
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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