Relying on Experts as We Reason Together

In various contexts, it is thought to be important that we reason together. For instance, an attractive conception of democracy requires that citizens reach lawmaking decisions by reasoning with one another. Reasoning requires that reasoners survey the considerations that they take to be reasons, pr...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Richardson, Henry S. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2012
In: Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal
Year: 2012, Volume: 22, Issue: 2, Pages: 91-110
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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520 |a In various contexts, it is thought to be important that we reason together. For instance, an attractive conception of democracy requires that citizens reach lawmaking decisions by reasoning with one another. Reasoning requires that reasoners survey the considerations that they take to be reasons, proceed by a coherent train of thought, and reach conclusions freely. De facto reliance on experts threatens the possibility of collective reasoning by making some reasons collectively unsurveyable, raising questions about the coherence of the resulting train of thought. De jure reliance on experts threatens the possibility of collective reasoning by seeming to make some conclusions irreversible. The paper argues that collective reasoning that relies on experts would nonetheless be possible if the unsurveyable reasons "mesh," if the expert considerations are at least in principle publicly recoverable, and if de jure authority of expert decision is always subject to appeal. 
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