Speaking of the Value of Life

The phrase ‘the value of life’ is important in bioethics, particularly for those who hold the traditional views that life has intrinsic value and that the distinction between killing and allowing to die is valid. Ambiguities in the meaning of ‘the value of life,’ however, can lead to errors in medic...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sulmasy, Daniel P. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2011
In: Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal
Year: 2011, Volume: 21, Issue: 2, Pages: 181-199
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