Kowtowing to a Non-natural Realm

Abstract Non-naturalists face a dilemma. They either leave their normative views hostage to a non-natural realm, which is immoral, or they do not, which is irrational. David Enoch has argued that the problem rests on cases of junk knowledge — conditionals that cannot be used to expand knowledge via...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Bedke, Matthew S. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: 2022
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2022, Volume: 19, Issue: 6, Pages: 559-576
Further subjects:B Non-naturalism
B Moral Realism
B junk-knowledge
B Metaethics
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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