An Experiment in Thought
This paper presents a new argument against philosophical theories based on arguments in favor of ontological reductions. The argument is an experiment in thought that has transcendental force, because it demonstrates the impossibility of forming a concept of anything with a reductionist nature. So a...
| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| 出版: |
Brill
2022
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| In: |
Philosophia reformata
Year: 2022, 卷: 87, 發布: 2, Pages: 151-177 |
| Further subjects: | B
Concept
B confirming experiences B Reduction B idea B Thought Experiment B Dualism B Materialism |
| 在線閱讀: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| 總結: | This paper presents a new argument against philosophical theories based on arguments in favor of ontological reductions. The argument is an experiment in thought that has transcendental force, because it demonstrates the impossibility of forming a concept of anything with a reductionist nature. So although we consider as examples only theories that try to reduce everything in accordance with the currently popular materialisms or dualism, the argument applies as well to every sort of reduction theory whatever. |
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| ISSN: | 2352-8230 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Philosophia reformata
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/23528230-bja10054 |