An Experiment in Thought
This paper presents a new argument against philosophical theories based on arguments in favor of ontological reductions. The argument is an experiment in thought that has transcendental force, because it demonstrates the impossibility of forming a concept of anything with a reductionist nature. So a...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Brill
2022
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| Στο/Στη: |
Philosophia reformata
Έτος: 2022, Τόμος: 87, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 151-177 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Concept
B confirming experiences B Reduction B idea B Thought Experiment B Dualism B Materialism |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | This paper presents a new argument against philosophical theories based on arguments in favor of ontological reductions. The argument is an experiment in thought that has transcendental force, because it demonstrates the impossibility of forming a concept of anything with a reductionist nature. So although we consider as examples only theories that try to reduce everything in accordance with the currently popular materialisms or dualism, the argument applies as well to every sort of reduction theory whatever. |
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| ISSN: | 2352-8230 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Philosophia reformata
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/23528230-bja10054 |