John Duns Scotus's Reportatio Parisiensis and the Origin of the Supertranscendentals

John Duns Scotus did not consider in a systematic fashion whether being is univocally common to real being and being of reason, despite the importance of the univocity of being in his metaphysics. The issue does arise in Reportatio Parisiensis I d. 29, an ambiguous text. Though Scotus seems to deny...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Smith, Garrett R. (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
Vérifier la disponibilité: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publié: 2018
Dans: Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales
Année: 2018, Volume: 85, Numéro: 2, Pages: 493-537
Accès en ligne: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Résumé:John Duns Scotus did not consider in a systematic fashion whether being is univocally common to real being and being of reason, despite the importance of the univocity of being in his metaphysics. The issue does arise in Reportatio Parisiensis I d. 29, an ambiguous text. Though Scotus seems to deny that being is univocally common to real being and being of reason, nevetheless he also allows that the primary division of being is into real being and being of reason. Thus, given that a commonality between these two realms of being is a condition for the emergence of the supertranscendental, some scholars have seen Scotus’s views in Reportatio Parisiensis I d. 29 as anticipating early modern notions of the supertranscendental. The present essay considers the criticism that Peter Auriol directed against Scotus’s position, and the opposite reactions to Auriol by Nicholas Bonetus and Petrus Thomae, who affirm (Bonetus) and deny (Thomae) that being is a supertranscendental.\n4207 \n4207
ISSN:1783-1717
Contient:Enthalten in: Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.2143/RTPM.85.2.3285398