Ockham über die Seele und ihre Teile

Ockham affirms that a human being consists of three really distinct forms that exist in matter, thus defending a «pluralist» position in the debate about the soul. However, he takes a «unitarist» position with regard to the rational soul, claiming that intellect and will are not really distinct. Why...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Perler, Dominik (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:German
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Peeters 2010
In: Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales
Year: 2010, Volume: 77, Issue: 2, Pages: 313-350
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

MARC

LEADER 00000naa a22000002 4500
001 1822441889
003 DE-627
005 20221115052821.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 221115s2010 xx |||||o 00| ||ger c
024 7 |a 10.2143/RTPM.77.2.2062481  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1822441889 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1822441889 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a ger 
084 |a 1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Perler, Dominik  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Ockham über die Seele und ihre Teile 
264 1 |c 2010 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a Ockham affirms that a human being consists of three really distinct forms that exist in matter, thus defending a «pluralist» position in the debate about the soul. However, he takes a «unitarist» position with regard to the rational soul, claiming that intellect and will are not really distinct. Why does he not admit a plurality of forms in the rational soul as well? And why does he think that the rational soul as a whole is really distinct from the sensory soul? This paper examines these questions, thus analyzing Ockham’s metaphysics of the soul. It pays close attention to his arguments both for a plurality of forms and for the unity of the rational soul. It argues that Ockham carefully distinguishes between forms that are metaphysical parts of a human being, and faculties that are ways of acting of a specific form. This distinction enables him to reject both a radical unitarism that accepts one single form in a human being, and an excessive pluralism that posits as many forms as there are faculties.\n4207 \n4207 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales  |d Leuven : Peeters, 1997  |g 77(2010), 2, Seite 313-350  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)387427848  |w (DE-600)2145018-3  |w (DE-576)112775624  |x 1783-1717  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:77  |g year:2010  |g number:2  |g pages:313-350 
856 |3 Volltext  |u http://www.jstor.org/stable/26173559  |x JSTOR 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.2143/RTPM.77.2.2062481  |x Resolving-System  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
856 4 0 |u https://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&id=2062481&journal_code=RTPM  |x Verlag  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
935 |a mteo 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 421108531X 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1822441889 
LOK |0 005 20221115052821 
LOK |0 008 221115||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2022-10-27#231AAA3B92933A4B3DED5CC3173B8106893A4A8C 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 866   |x JSTOR#http://www.jstor.org/stable/26173559 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixrk  |a zota 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw