REVIEW OF ROBERT SPAEMANN'S PERSONS

This review presents the principal themes of Robert Spaemann's Persons: The Difference between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something.’ To be a person is not to be identical with one's teleological nature, but rather, to have that nature. Personal consciousness is necessarily temporal consciousness. Per...

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書目詳細資料
主要作者: Madigan, Arthur (Author)
格式: 電子 Review
語言:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
出版: 2010
In: Journal of religious ethics
Year: 2010, 卷: 38, 發布: 2, Pages: 373-392
Further subjects:B Nature
B 書評
B Robert Spaemann
B 個人
B Love
B Conscience
B Responsibility
B Freedom
B Teleology
B Recognition
在線閱讀: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
實物特徵
總結:This review presents the principal themes of Robert Spaemann's Persons: The Difference between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something.’ To be a person is not to be identical with one's teleological nature, but rather, to have that nature. Personal consciousness is necessarily temporal consciousness. Persons have a range of distinctively personal acts, such as recognizing and respecting one another, understanding their lives as wholes, making judgments of conscience, promising, and forgiving. All members of the human species, whatever their stage of development or limitations, are persons. The present review also briefly considers certain objections that have been raised against Spaemann's position.
ISSN:1467-9795
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9795.2010.00433.x