KILLING, SELF-DEFENSE, AND BAD LUCK

This essay argues on behalf of a hybrid theory for an ethics of self-defense understood as the Forfeiture-Partiality Theory. The theory weds the idea that a malicious attacker forfeits the right to life to the idea that we are permitted to prefer one's life to another's in cases of involun...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Miller, Richard B. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley-Blackwell 2009
In: Journal of religious ethics
Year: 2009, Volume: 37, Issue: 1, Pages: 131-158
Further subjects:B Self-defense
B Luck
B Innocence
B objectively unjust threat
B Partiality
B forfeiture
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
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