The Uniqueness of Persons

Persons are thought to have a special kind of value, often called “dignity,” which, according to Kant, makes them both infinitely valuable and irreplaceably valuable. The author aims to identify what makes a person a person in a way that can explain both aspects of dignity. She considers five defini...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Zagzebski, Linda (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley-Blackwell 2001
In: Journal of religious ethics
Year: 2001, Volume: 29, Issue: 3, Pages: 401-423
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Parallel Edition:Non-electronic

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