On what god would do
Many debates in the philosophy of religion, particularly arguments for and against the existence of God, depend on a claim or set of claims about what God—qua sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being—would do, either directly or indirectly, in particular cases or in general. Accor...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
2009
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| Em: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Ano: 2009, Volume: 66, Número: 2, Páginas: 87-104 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Evidential argument from evil
B Broad Epistemic Theism B Skeptical theism B Intrinsic dependence B God B Extrinsic dependence B Narrow Skeptical Theism B Broad Skeptical Theism |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Não eletrônico
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| Resumo: | Many debates in the philosophy of religion, particularly arguments for and against the existence of God, depend on a claim or set of claims about what God—qua sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being—would do, either directly or indirectly, in particular cases or in general. Accordingly, before these debates can be resolved we must first settle the more fundamental issue of whether we can know, or at least have justified belief about, what God would do. In this paper, I lay out the possible positions on the issue of whether we can know what God would do, positions I refer to as Broad Skeptical Theism, Broad Epistemic Theism, and Narrow Skeptical Theism. I then examine the implications of each of these views and argue that each presents serious problems for theism. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-009-9200-6 |
