RT Article
T1 Belief, faith, and acceptance
JF International journal for philosophy of religion
VO 63
IS 1
SP 87
OP 102
A1 Audi, Robert
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2008
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1821423895
AB Belief is a central focus of inquiry in the philosophy of religion and indeed in the field of religion itself. No one conception of belief is central in all these cases, and sometimes the term ‘belief’ is used where ‘faith’ or ‘acceptance’ would better express what is intended. This paper sketches the major concepts in the philosophy of religion that are expressed by these three terms. In doing so, it distinguishes propositional belief (belief that) from both objectual belief (believing something to have a property) and, more importantly, belief in (a trusting attitude that is illustrated by at least many paradigm cases of belief in God). Faith is shown to have a similar complexity, and even propositional faith divides into importantly different categories. Acceptance differs from both belief and faith in that at least one kind of acceptance is behavioral in a way neither of the other two elements is. Acceptance of a proposition, it is argued, does not entail believing it, nor does believing entail acceptance in any distinctive sense of the latter term. In characterizing these three notions (and related ones), the paper provides some basic materials important both for understanding a person’s religious position and for appraising its rationality. The nature of religious faith and some of the conditions for its rationality, including some deriving from elements of an ethics of belief, are explored in some detail.
K1 Rationality
K1 Probability
K1 Justification
K1 Hope
K1 Faith
K1 Evidence
K1 Defeasibility
K1 Conviction
K1 Ethics of belief
K1 Belief
K1 Acceptance
DO 10.1007/s11153-007-9137-6