Retributive karma and the problem of blaming the victim
A defining feature of retributive conceptions of karma is their regarding of suffering or misfortune as consequent upon sins committed in previous lives. Some critical non-believers in karma take offence at this view, considering it to involve unjustly blaming the victim. Defenders of the view demur...
Autor principal: | |
---|---|
Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
Lenguaje: | Inglés |
Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2013
|
En: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Año: 2013, Volumen: 74, Número: 2, Páginas: 149-165 |
Otras palabras clave: | B
Buddhism
B Arvind Sharma B Reincarnation B Hinduism B Ludwig Wittgenstein B Blaming the victim B Karma |
Acceso en línea: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Parallel Edition: | Electrónico
|
Sumario: | A defining feature of retributive conceptions of karma is their regarding of suffering or misfortune as consequent upon sins committed in previous lives. Some critical non-believers in karma take offence at this view, considering it to involve unjustly blaming the victim. Defenders of the view demur, and argue that a belief in retributive karma in fact provides a motivation for benevolent action. This article elucidates the debate, showing that its depth is such that it is best characterized as a disagreement in form of life (in Wittgenstein’s sense) rather than as a disagreement in opinions. Also briefly discussed is an example of a non-retributive form that belief in karma and reincarnation can take. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-012-9376-z |