No explanation of persons, no explanation of resurrection: on Lynne Baker’s constitution view and the resurrection of human persons

I don’t think Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view can account for personal identity problems of a synchronic or diachronic nature. As such, it cannot accommodate the Christian’s claim of eschatological bodily resurrection-a principle reason for which she gives this account. In light of this, I pr...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Turner, James T. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2014
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2014, Volume: 76, Issue: 3, Pages: 297-317
Further subjects:B Bodily resurrection
B Lynne Baker
B Material constitution
B Personal Identity
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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