A defense of middle knowledge

Adams has not demonstrated that conditionals of freedom are necessarily false, just as I have not demonstrated that they are possibly true. According to Adams, we have good reason to think that they are not possibly true because we do not know what it is for them to be true. This is basically the cl...

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Autor principal: Otte, Richard (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
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Publicado: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 1987
En: International journal for philosophy of religion
Año: 1987, Volumen: 21, Número: 3, Páginas: 161-169
Otras palabras clave:B Present State
B Free Choice
B Similar Consideration
B Good Reason
B Actual State
Acceso en línea: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Parallel Edition:No electrónico

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520 |a Adams has not demonstrated that conditionals of freedom are necessarily false, just as I have not demonstrated that they are possibly true. According to Adams, we have good reason to think that they are not possibly true because we do not know what it is for them to be true. This is basically the claim that we cannot explain conditionals of freedom without reference to what would happen in certain situations. I argued that similar considerations apply to propositions about future free choices. We cannot explain propositions about future free choices without reference to what will happen. Neither conditionals of freedom nor propositions about future free choices are true in virtue of corresponding to actual states of affairs or any states of affairs that are necessitated by certain other states of affairs. In both instances we must appeal to states of affairs that are not determined to be actual by either the present states of affairs or the antecedent of the counterfactual. I do not consider this difficulty with propositions about future free choices to be a sufficient reason to reject the possibility of them being true. They are true because they correspond to what will happen. But then I also do not believe that Adams' reasons are sufficient to reject the possibility of true conditionals of freedom. They are true because they correspond with what would happen in certain counterfactual situations. Hence it is no more difficult to understand what it is for conditionals of freedom to be true than it is to understand what it is for propositions about future free choices to be true. I conclude that, contrary to Adams, it is possible for God to have middle knowledge. 
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