Religious disagreements and epistemic rationality
Richard Feldman has argued that in cases of religious disagreement between epistemic peers who have shared all relevant evidence, epistemic rationality requires suspense of judgment. I argue that Feldman’s postulation of completely shared evidence is unrealistic for the kinds of disputes he is consi...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2013
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2013, Volume: 74, Issue: 1, Pages: 33-48 |
| Further subjects: | B
Evidentialism
B Epistemic rationality B Religious disagreements B Shared evidence B Feldman B Epistemic peers B Suspense of judgment |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Electronic
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