Representing the Parent Analogy

I argue that Stephen Wykstra's much discussed Parent Analogy is still helpful in responding to the evidential problem of evil when coupled with so-called positive skeptical theism, despite recent valid criticisms of the analogy. Positive skeptical theism, defended by John DePoe, says that al...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Shields, Jannai (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
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Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham 2021
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2021, Volume: 13, Issue: 4, Pages: 157-174
Further subjects:B Parent Analogy
B Skeptical Theism
B problem of evil
B Evidential Argument
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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520 |a I argue that Stephen Wykstra's much discussed Parent Analogy is still helpful in responding to the evidential problem of evil when coupled with so-called positive skeptical theism, despite recent valid criticisms of the analogy. Positive skeptical theism, defended by John DePoe, says that although we often remain in the dark about the first-order reasons that God allows particular instances of suffering, we can have positive second-order reasons that God would create a world with seemingly gratuitous evils. I further explain positive skeptical theism and then apply it to the Parent Analogy, saying that a plausible second-order reason that God would allow seemingly gratuitous evils is that God, like a good parent, wants a rightly ordered friendship with created beings. Then, because this sort of friendship is significantly disanalogous to human parent-child relationships, I go beyond the analogy and directly argue that friendship with God will involve ignorance of suffering-justifying goods. 
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