Maximal possessiveness: A serious flaw in the evil God challenge
The Evil God (EG) challenge alleges that because arguments used to support belief in a Good God (GG) can be mirrored by the EG hypothesis, then belief in the former is no more reasonable than belief in the latter. Thus, there is an epistemic symmetry between both hypotheses. This paper argues that o...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2022
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2022, Volume: 92, Issue: 2, Pages: 73-88 |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |