Maximal possessiveness: A serious flaw in the evil God challenge

The Evil God (EG) challenge alleges that because arguments used to support belief in a Good God (GG) can be mirrored by the EG hypothesis, then belief in the former is no more reasonable than belief in the latter. Thus, there is an epistemic symmetry between both hypotheses. This paper argues that o...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Miksa, Rad (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2022
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2022, Volume: 92, Issue: 2, Pages: 73-88
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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520 |a The Evil God (EG) challenge alleges that because arguments used to support belief in a Good God (GG) can be mirrored by the EG hypothesis, then belief in the former is no more reasonable than belief in the latter. Thus, there is an epistemic symmetry between both hypotheses. This paper argues that one of the EG’s secondary traits, specifically his maximal possessiveness, would render it very likely, if not certain, that the EG would not create anything at all. By contrast, the GG would very likely create. Consequently, the existence of anything non-divine would generate a significant asymmetry between the hypotheses—one that favors the GG hypothesis. Moreover, strategies to overcome this argument fail, and as such, the EG challenge is severely undermined. 
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