The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism

Abstract The Projectability Challenge states that a metaethical view must explain how ordinary agents can, on the basis of moral experience and reflection, accurately and justifiably apply moral concepts to novel situations. In this paper, we argue for two primary claims. First, paradigm nonnaturali...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Bengson, John (Author) ; Cuneo, Terence (Author) ; Reisner, Andrew (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2020
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2020, Volume: 17, Issue: 5, Pages: 471-498
Further subjects:B essences
B Concepts
B Projection
B moral nonnaturalism
B moral naturalism
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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