Unwitting Behavior and Responsibility
Abstract Unlike much work on responsibility, George Sher's new book, Who Knew?: Responsibility Without Awareness, focuses on the relationship between knowledge and responsibility. Sher argues against the view that responsibility depends on an agent's awareness of the nature and consequence...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2011
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| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2011, Volume: 8, Issue: 1, Pages: 139-152 |
| Further subjects: | B
KNOWLEDGE CONDITION
B EVALUATIVE JUDGMENTS B GEORGE SHER B Blame B Responsibility |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Unlike much work on responsibility, George Sher's new book, Who Knew?: Responsibility Without Awareness, focuses on the relationship between knowledge and responsibility. Sher argues against the view that responsibility depends on an agent's awareness of the nature and consequences of her action. According to Sher's alternative proposal, even agents who are unaware of important features of their actions may be morally or prudentially responsible for their behavior. While I agree with many of Sher's central conclusions, I explore the worry that, as it stands, his account may only justify ascriptions of a relatively superficial form of responsibility. | ||
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