Well-Being Thresholds and Moral Priority

A welfarist basic minimum is a level of well-being which is the threshold for minimally adequate lives and which serves, in some sense, as a line of moral priority. In his ambitious and philosophically sophisticated book, Dale Dorsey takes on the task of specifying a welfarist basic minimum. His acc...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Adler, Matthew D. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2015
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2015, Volume: 12, Issue: 6, Pages: 773-786
Further subjects:B preferences
B Poverty
B Well-being
B moral thresholds
B Welfarism
B basic minimum
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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