Trade-offs, Transitivity, and Temkin

In this essay I critically assess Larry S. Temkin’s new book, Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning. While I find that there is much to praise about this work, I focus on two points of critique. Generally, Temkin’s aims in this book are to expose a radical tension i...

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Autore principale: Dorsey, Dale (Autore)
Tipo di documento: Elettronico Articolo
Lingua:Inglese
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Pubblicazione: 2015
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Anno: 2015, Volume: 12, Fascicolo: 3, Pagine: 331-342
Altre parole chiave:B Welfare
B Trade-offs
B transitivity
B Intrinsic Value
Accesso online: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Riepilogo:In this essay I critically assess Larry S. Temkin’s new book, Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning. While I find that there is much to praise about this work, I focus on two points of critique. Generally, Temkin’s aims in this book are to expose a radical tension in our beliefs about value, and to show that one potentially palatable (if not ultimately acceptable) option is to reject the transitivity of the predicate “better than”. However, I argue that in both his motivation for claiming that such a tension exists, and one of his arguments that transitivity is a palatable option, his discussion is missing a crucial step: a first-order discussion of the relationship between intrinsic values; both personal welfare goods and impersonal goods (such as equality, overall utility, etc.).
ISSN:1745-5243
Comprende:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/17455243-01203001