Deontological Restrictions and the Good/Bad Asymmetry
Abstract I argue that a defense of deontological restrictions need not resort to what I call the 'Good/Bad asymmetry', according to which it is morally more important to avoid harming others than to prevent just such harm. I replace this paradoxical asymmetry with two non-paradoxical (if a...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Published: |
Brill
2009
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| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2009, Volume: 6, Issue: 4, Pages: 464-481 |
| Further subjects: | B
AGENT-RELATIVITY
B BENEFIT B HARM B DEONTOLOGY |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
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| 520 | |a Abstract I argue that a defense of deontological restrictions need not resort to what I call the 'Good/Bad asymmetry', according to which it is morally more important to avoid harming others than to prevent just such harm. I replace this paradoxical asymmetry with two non-paradoxical (if also non-obvious) ones. These are the following: (a) We ought to treat an act of preventing harm to persons precisely as such (as a harm prevention), rather than as the causing of a benefit; but we ought to treat an act that causes harm precisely as such (as a harm causing), rather than as the prevention of a benefit. (b) It is morally more important not to cause harm than to cause benefit. I show how we can use those asymmetries, together with certain other assumptions, to defend restrictions. I also offer a partial defense of the first of the two asymmetries. | ||
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