Imperfect Duties, Group Obligations, and Beneficence

There is virtually no philosophical consensus on what, exactly, imperfect duties are. In this paper, I lay out three criteria which I argue any adequate account of imperfect duties should satisfy. Using beneficence as a leading example, I suggest that existing accounts of imperfect duties will have...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Schroeder, S. Andrew (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: 2014
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2014, Volume: 11, Issue: 5, Pages: 557-584
Further subjects:B Murphy, Liam
B Beneficence
B Collective Responsibility
B group agency
B imperfect duties
B discursive dilemma
B Singer, Peter
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

MARC

LEADER 00000caa a22000002c 4500
001 1817476246
003 DE-627
005 20241205202910.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 220927s2014 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1163/17455243-4681020  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1817476246 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1817476246 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Schroeder, S. Andrew  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Imperfect Duties, Group Obligations, and Beneficence 
264 1 |c 2014 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a There is virtually no philosophical consensus on what, exactly, imperfect duties are. In this paper, I lay out three criteria which I argue any adequate account of imperfect duties should satisfy. Using beneficence as a leading example, I suggest that existing accounts of imperfect duties will have trouble meeting those criteria. I then propose a new approach: thinking of imperfect duties as duties held by groups, rather than individuals. I show, again using the example of beneficence, that this proposal can satisfy the criteria, explaining how something can both have the necessity characteristic of duty, while also allowing agents the latitude which seems to attach to imperfect duties. 
650 4 |a Singer, Peter 
650 4 |a Murphy, Liam 
650 4 |a imperfect duties 
650 4 |a group agency 
650 4 |a discursive dilemma 
650 4 |a Collective Responsibility 
650 4 |a Beneficence 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Journal of moral philosophy  |d Leiden : Brill, 2004  |g 11(2014), 5, Seite 557-584  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)474382281  |w (DE-600)2169771-1  |w (DE-576)273875329  |x 1745-5243  |7 nnas 
773 1 8 |g volume:11  |g year:2014  |g number:5  |g pages:557-584 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681020  |x Resolving-System  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext  |7 1 
856 4 0 |u https://brill.com/view/journals/jmp/11/5/article-p557_1.xml  |x Verlag  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext  |7 1 
935 |a mteo 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 4192069245 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1817476246 
LOK |0 005 20220927053013 
LOK |0 008 220927||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2022-09-22#1CE50032C90417D91BD8BE3DDC8245E667B84DE4 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixrk  |a zota 
LOK |0 939   |a 27-09-22  |b l01 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw