‘Animals Do It Too!’: The Franklin Defence of Meat-Eating

Abstract The Franklin defence of meat-eating is the claim that meat-eating is morally permissible because animals eat other animals. I examine five versions of this defence. I argue that two versions, claiming respectively that might is right and that animals deserve to be eaten, can easily be dismi...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Telfer, Elizabeth (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2004
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2004, Volume: 1, Issue: 1, Pages: 51-67
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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