Rawls's Practical Conception of Justice: Opinion, Tradition and Objectivity in Political Liberalism

Abstract In Political Liberalism, Rawls emphasizes the practical character and aims of his conception of justice. Justice as fairness is to provide the basis of a reasoned, informed and willing political agreement by locating grounds for consensus in the fundamental ideas and values of the political...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Kaufman, Alexander (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2006
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2006, Volume: 3, Issue: 1, Pages: 23-43
Further subjects:B Reflective Equilibrium
B Objectivity
B Political Liberalism
B Justification
B Rawls
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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