Natural Separateness: Why Parfit's Reductionist Account of Persons Fails to Support Consequentialism
Abstract My goal in this essay will be to show, contra Parfit, that the separateness of human persons—although metaphysically shallow—has a moral significance that should not be overlooked. Parfit holds that his reductionist view of personal identity lends support to consequentialism; I reject this...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2009
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| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2009, Volume: 6, Issue: 2, Pages: 178-195 |
| Further subjects: | B
Persons
B CONSEQUENTIALISM B SEPARATENESS B Reductionism B Identity |
| Online Access: |
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