Natural Separateness: Why Parfit's Reductionist Account of Persons Fails to Support Consequentialism

Abstract My goal in this essay will be to show, contra Parfit, that the separateness of human persons—although metaphysically shallow—has a moral significance that should not be overlooked. Parfit holds that his reductionist view of personal identity lends support to consequentialism; I reject this...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Christie, Tim (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2009
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2009, Volume: 6, Issue: 2, Pages: 178-195
Further subjects:B Persons
B CONSEQUENTIALISM
B SEPARATENESS
B Reductionism
B Identity
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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