Scanlon on Permissibility and Double Effect*

In his book Moral Dimensions. Permissibility, Meaning, Blame, T.M. Scanlon proposes a new account of permissibility, and argues, against the doctrine of double effect (DDE), that intentions do not matter for permissibility. I argue that Scanlon's account of permissibility as based on what the a...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Elster, Jakob (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2012
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2012, Volume: 9, Issue: 1, Pages: 75-102
Further subjects:B Scanlon
B Intention
B subjective ought
B Permissibility
B doctrine of double effect
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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