RT Article
T1 Enoch’s Defense of Robust Meta-Ethical Realism
JF Journal of moral philosophy
VO 13
IS 1
SP 101
OP 112
A1 Björnsson, Gunnar
A1 Olinder, Ragnar Francén
A2 Olinder, Ragnar Francén
LA English
YR 2016
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1817474642
AB Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch’s book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch’s position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central passages. We focus on Enoch’s two original positive arguments for non-naturalist realism, one argument building on first order moral implications of different meta-ethical positions, the other attending to the rational commitment to normative facts inherent in practical deliberation. We also pay special attention to Enoch’s handling of two types of objections to non-naturalist realism, objections having to do with the possibility of moral knowledge and with moral disagreement.
K1 Disagreement
K1 moral skepticism
K1 Normativity
K1 Meta-ethics
K1 Realism
K1 Non-naturalism
K1 David Enoch
DO 10.1163/17455243-01301001