Enoch’s Defense of Robust Meta-Ethical Realism

Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch’s book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch’s position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Björnsson, Gunnar (Author) ; Olinder, Ragnar Francén (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2016
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2016, Volume: 13, Issue: 1, Pages: 101-112
Further subjects:B Non-naturalism
B Meta-ethics
B Realism
B Disagreement
B David Enoch
B moral skepticism
B Normativity
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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