Natural Deficiency or Social Oppression? The Capabilities Approach to Justice for People with Disabilities

Theories of distributive justice are often criticised for either excluding people with disabilities from the domain of justice altogether, or casting them as deficient in personal attributes. I argue that the capabilities approach to justice is largely immune to these flaws. It has the conceptual re...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Barclay, Linda (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: 2012
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2012, Volume: 9, Issue: 4, Pages: 500-520
Further subjects:B Disability
B Distributive Justice
B Capabilities
B Nussbaum
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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