Retribution and Organic Unities

Abstract G.E. Moore argued that his principle of organic unities, according to which the value of a whole is to be distinguished from the value of the sum of its parts, is consistent with a retributivist view of punishment: both crime and punishment are intrinsic evils but the combination of the cri...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Clark, Michael (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2006
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2006, Volume: 3, Issue: 3, Pages: 351-358
Further subjects:B Moore
B Bentham
B Organic Unities
B Retribution
B Dancy
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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