RT Article
T1 Which Moral Properties Are Eligible for Perceptual Awareness?
JF Journal of moral philosophy
VO 17
IS 3
SP 290
OP 319
A1 Werner, Preston J.
LA English
YR 2020
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1817474251
AB Abstract: Moral perception has made something of a comeback in recent work on moral epistemology. Many traditional objections to the view have been argued to fail upon closer inspection. But it remains an open question just how far moral perception might extend. In this paper, I provide the beginnings of an answer to this question by assessing the relationship between the metaphysical structure of different normative properties and a plausible constraint on which properties are eligible for perceptual awareness which I call the Counterfactual Strengthening Test. Along the way I consider and reject a few other possible constraints on perceptual awareness. I defend the view that moral perception is restricted to the perception of evaluative and pro tanto deontic properties. I conclude with a few gestures toward what this limitation on moral perception may mean for broader moral epistemology.
K1 perceptual awareness
K1 evaluative properties
K1 normative properties
K1 Perception
K1 moral perception
K1 moral epistemology
DO 10.1163/17455243-20182801