RT Article
T1 Normativity and Practical Judgement
JF Journal of moral philosophy
VO 4
IS 3
SP 393
OP 405
A1 O'Neill, Onora
LA English
YR 2007
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1817474103
AB Abstract Norms are apt for reasoning because they have propositional structure and content; they are practical because they aim to guide action, rather than to describe aspects of the world. These two features hold equally of norms construed sociologically as the norms of specific social groups, and of norms conceived abstractly as principles of action. On either view, norms are indeterminate while acts are particular and determinate. Consequently norms cannot fully specify which particular act is to be done. Are they then not genuinely action-guiding unless supplemented by practical judgment? Yet accounts of practical judgement are often thin, sometimes seeing it as blind, unreasoned 'picking' of one rather than another enactment of a norm. However, on another view practical judgement carries the substantive task of seeking ways of acting that satisfy a plurality of norms, which can be both reasoned and practical.
K1 Practical Principles
K1 Remainders
K1 Norms
K1 Moral Conflict
K1 Judgement
K1 Direction of fit
DO 10.1177/1740468107083251