What Does Morality Require When We Disagree?
In “Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy” Simon C. May argues that we do not have a principled moral reason to compromise. While I seek to understand how more precisely we are to understand this suggestion, I also object to it: I argue that we have a principled moral reason to accept d...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2019
|
| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2019, Volume: 16, Issue: 1, Pages: 27-49 |
| Further subjects: | B
Disagreement
B Democracy B Legitimacy B compromise |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
MARC
| LEADER | 00000naa a22000002 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 1817473816 | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20220927053006.0 | ||
| 007 | cr uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 220927s2019 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1163/17455243-20170001 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (DE-627)1817473816 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)KXP1817473816 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rda | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 084 | |a 1 |2 ssgn | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Andersen, Martin Marchman |e VerfasserIn |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a What Does Morality Require When We Disagree? |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2019 | |
| 336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a Computermedien |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Online-Ressource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | |a In “Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy” Simon C. May argues that we do not have a principled moral reason to compromise. While I seek to understand how more precisely we are to understand this suggestion, I also object to it: I argue that we have a principled moral reason to accept democratic decisions that we disagree with, and that this can only be so if disagreement can change what the all things considered right political position is. But if this is so, then also a principled moral reason to compromise is possible. I suggest that there is a class of procedures, including compromise, voting, expert delegation, and coin flip, such that when we disagree about what justice requires, we have a principled moral reason (though not necessarily a decisive reason) to engage in one of these procedures. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Legitimacy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Disagreement | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Democracy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a compromise | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Legitimacy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Disagreement | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Democracy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a compromise | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t Journal of moral philosophy |d Leiden : Brill, 2004 |g 16(2019), 1, Seite 27-49 |h Online-Ressource |w (DE-627)474382281 |w (DE-600)2169771-1 |w (DE-576)273875329 |x 1745-5243 |7 nnns |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:16 |g year:2019 |g number:1 |g pages:27-49 |
| 856 | |u https://backend.orbit.dtu.dk/ws/files/162056977/What_does_morality_require_when_we_disagree.pdf |x unpaywall |z Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang |h repository [oa repository (via OAI-PMH doi match)] | ||
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20170001 |x Resolving-System |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://brill.com/view/journals/jmp/16/1/article-p27_27.xml |x Verlag |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
| 935 | |a mteo | ||
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| ELC | |a 1 | ||
| ITA | |a 1 |t 1 | ||
| LOK | |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 | ||
| LOK | |0 001 4192066815 | ||
| LOK | |0 003 DE-627 | ||
| LOK | |0 004 1817473816 | ||
| LOK | |0 005 20220927053006 | ||
| LOK | |0 008 220927||||||||||||||||ger||||||| | ||
| LOK | |0 035 |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2022-09-23#DD617ECA8B58F7198C2AECC4FEC44CB97C8F7335 | ||
| LOK | |0 040 |a DE-Tue135 |c DE-627 |d DE-Tue135 | ||
| LOK | |0 092 |o n | ||
| LOK | |0 852 |a DE-Tue135 | ||
| LOK | |0 852 1 |9 00 | ||
| LOK | |0 935 |a ixzs |a ixrk |a zota | ||
| OAS | |a 1 | ||
| ORI | |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw | ||