RT Article
T1 Egalitarianism Reconsidered
JF Journal of moral philosophy
VO 8
IS 4
SP 567
OP 586
A1 Hausman, Daniel M.
A1 Waldren, Matt Sensat
LA English
PB Brill
YR 2011
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1817473514
AB This paper argues that egalitarian theories should be judged by the degree to which they meet four different challenges. Fundamentalist egalitarianism, which contends that certain inequalities are intrinsically bad or unjust regardless of their consequences, fails to meet these challenges. Building on discussions by T.M. Scanlon and David Miller, we argue that egalitarianism is better understood in terms of commitments to six egalitarian objectives. A consequence of our view, in contrast to Martin O’Neill’s “non-intrinsic egalitarianism,” is that egalitarianism is better understood as a family of views than as a single ethical position.
K1 Justice
K1 Fairness
K1 Equality
K1 Egalitarianism
DO 10.1163/174552411X601067